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The Unique and International and the
Imperative of Discourse
Khaled Abou El Fadl*
I. BETWEEN INTERNATIONALISM AND PARTICULARISM
When we consider the dynamics between international law and the
paradigms of cultural and moral uniqueness or particularity, we ought to think
about two distinct aspects of this relationship or dynamic. On the one hand,
there is the issue of whether international law ought to care about unique and
particular manifestations of culture and morality. This is especially so when
talking about the relationship of international law to religion. International law-
in particular the human rights tradition within international law-represents a
set of normative claims about the way that human beings ought to act, behave,
and even, at times, think. As such, international law makes intrusive demands
upon the moral space in which human beings function. But this is the same
moral space for which claims of moral particularity or religion compete, and the
pertinent question is: should the proponents of international law defer, in any
fashion, to the competing claims for moral space that are made by the
proponents of moral particularity or religion? On the flip side of this equation is
the equally compelling consideration: whether particular or unique religious
systems or cultural paradigms ought to care about or defer to the competing
claims of international law? In essence, the question can be posed with equal
force to both paradigms: the paradigm of internationalism and the paradigm of
moral uniqueness.
I will be arguing that in fact both paradigms have no alternative but to be
concerned with what the other has to offer, and I will do so on the basis of a
theoretical exposition. Coherent theoretical stands are often the only safeguard
against result-oriented activism. When human rights activists and religious
activists act without the restraint of reflective and self-critical pauses, they often
end up violating the moral space in which human beings function. Instead of
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presenting claims that could be evaluated and negotiated, their behavior starts to
resemble an arrogant and self-absorbed invasion of the moral space of the
"other." But, as we encounter in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
intrusive invasions of the moral space of others is at times well justified and
clearly warranted, but it ought not to be done lightly. At a minimum, any act of
moral interventionism, in which internationalists challenge and attempt to deny
more particular visions of the right or good life, must be justified in coherent
and accountable terms-otherwise, moral interventionism starts appearing
whimsical and despotic. I should note that my own expertise comes primarily in
the Islamic context and so much of what I am going to say will relate to the
context of Islamic law and Islamic tradition, and their interaction with the
international context.
II. INTERNATIONALISM, CONSENT, AND
FAILURES OF PROCESS
Returning to the main issue on hand, the question this Article poses is in
two parts: (i) should international law be concerned with what the paradigm of
uniqueness-sometimes referred to as cultural relativism or cultural specificity-
has to say; and (ii) should the culturally relative be concerned with what
international law has to say? As to the first part, international law is, by its very
structure, an amorphous and rather negotiable construct. While it is possible to
pretend that international law can be reduced to a positive and particularized set
of commands, often what we observe taking place in international law is an
implementation of particular commands, within a certain hierarchal structure of
priorities, that are based on moral imperatives. These moral imperatives-if
international law is to mean anything at all-are supposed to transcend the
particular and the unique to reach the general and universal. It would not make
any sense if international law created imperatives that simply were bound to each
specific context because then, logically, each specific context, if given its full
extent, would completely negate international law. The very logic of international
law is one of universality and generality. International law cannot be made to
defer to specific or particular conditions and at the same time retain its integrity
as an international, or multi-national legal system. But at the same time that
international law is supposed to transcend the particular and the unique, like all
legal systems, international law is founded on the assumption that it has
legitimacy. And, in fact, it is reasonable to maintain that international law in
particular has a functional need to bolster and deepen its claim to legitimacy. In
addition, I would argue that even if one assumes a natural law premise, the
legitimacy of international law must necessarily rely on one form of consent
theory or another. So, even if per international law, one asserts a right to dignity,
the person who exercises the right must consent to being dignified-he must
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desire it, and even, in certain circumstances, demand it. Interestingly, it becomes
undignified, or it becomes a negation of dignity, to force someone to be
dignified, if they do not wish or desire dignity. Therefore, the legitimacy of
international law distills itself in a presumed paradigm of collective consent, not
necessarily the consent of each individual person, but some degree of collectivity
by which a people relinquish an amount of autonomy in exchange for a regime
of rights and duties. In a sense, the collectivity, however it is defined,
relinquishes something of its particularity and specificity in return for an
international regime of safeguards and protections, whether such safeguards and
protections accrue to the benefit of the collectivity or the individuals who
constitute the collectivity. To be quite clear about the premises of international
law and what international law means: international law is premised on a
consensual relinquishing of a degree of autonomy in return for a generalized
regime of rights and duties.
Significantly, the age-old presumption often made by international lawyers,
that consent is dependent on a state or government, which represents the
collectivity, by now has become thoroughly flawed and discredited. There are
many reasons for this, but, at a minimum, the state is often an imperfect, and
indeed inadequate, conduit for legitimacy and consent. Whether the state binds
itself to an international obligation or dissents from it is not particularly
informative or telling as to whether the collectivity, which the state is supposed
to represent, in fact agrees or disagrees with the position of the state. Put more
simply, governments are institutions that develop their own sets of vested
interests, and their own mechanics and dynamics of power. Reliance on the
state, or the governments that represent states, as the main agency for obtaining
legitimacy and consent, effectively means nothing more than dealing with an
elite within the state-the elite that claims to represent the state. In other words,
the reality is that when we deal with the state, we are not dealing with the
collectivity that a government claims to represent, but with a particular set of
vested interests within the collectivity, and those interests are often the interests
of an elite, and not the collectivity, as a whole. Of course, democratic
governments can more convincingly claim to represent the genuine interests of
their collectivities than can despotic systems of government, but it would be a
mistake to presume that democracies are perfect in this regard. Even
democracies do not equally represent the interests of their own collectivities
because of social and political imbalances, and economic, racial, and class
inequalities that plague most, if not all, democracies in the world. Especially
when it comes to matters that implicate international law, democracies do not
equally represent the interests of their citizens. From a sociological point of
view, in democracies, matters that relate to international law are usually part of
the realm of consciousness of only the most educated and privileged classes
within society. For the least empowered classes in a democracy, matters that
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implicate international relations or the law of nations are usually too remote and
intangible to be seriously experienced and engaged. In addition, to the extent
that democracies defer to the will of majorities, the interests of minority groups
continue to be in a disadvantageous position as far as the processes of
international law are concerned.
Accepting the argument that the state is an imperfect representative-an
imperfect conduit for legitimacy and consent in international law, and that for
international law to be meaningful, one must transcend the traditional
dependency on state representation and state consent, we are then left to deal
with the actual international collectivity, in other words, human beings. It is
important to emphasize what ought to be rather obvious, and that is, it is human
beings who are the actual source of legitimacy for the regime of duties and rights
under international law. In order, however, for the legitimacy of international
law to be effective-if we are going to avoid the age-old problems of
majoritarian dictatorships, cultural hegemony, or the autocracy of an elite-we
must acknowledge that, as a corollary to the right to consent, and also as a
corollary to the process of relinquishing autonomy voluntarily, uniqueness is
important. Uniqueness or the freedom to be unique and take exception is not
simply a concession made by international law to cultural relativism. Rather, it is
a necessary, and inescapable, acknowledgement of the requirements for the
legitimacy of international law.
Most importantly, uniqueness is not simply the right to dissent from the
imperatives set by an international regime. Often, when international lawyers
approach the issue of cultural relativism, they speak in terms of whether
international law ought to incorporate a system of uniqueness, and by that they
mean, whether international law ought to incorporate a system of dissentions or
exceptions. But this is a very limited and partial, and indeed often unhelpful, way
of understanding the issue of uniqueness. In fact, uniqueness is not simply the
right to dissent in particular circumstances, but it is the right to contribute to the
formulation of international imperatives so that this uniqueness becomes the
right to shape the ultimate form of international obligations-the ultimate form
of the international regime. In this sense, the answer to the question of whether
international law ought to care about uniqueness, must inevitably be yes.
International law in fact has no choice but to care about the particular and
unique. But I think that it is helpful that international lawyers not be focused on
the unique as simply a process of dissenting or a paradigm of exceptionalism,
but the unique as the process of contributing one's own identity-one's
particular identity-into the ultimate shape of international law, and the ultimate
shape of rights and duties that arise within that paradigm.
Now that I have discounted the state as an appropriate representative of
legitimacy and consent, we then get into the problems of international law as it is
shaped in the present international context. On this point, I think it is quite right
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to say that international law often experiences a failure of process. This failure of
process is due to the fact that the ability of the unique to contribute to the
formation of international law, like many other things in life, is vulnerable to
power dynamics, class interests, patriarchy, and a whole host of other limitations
that influence, subvert, and even undermine the process. I would argue that in
order for international law to have a meaningful impact, and as a part of
grounding itself in legitimacy and consent, while engaging in the process of
incorporating the unique, we need to think very particularly and specifically
about the means of democratizing the processes of international law, and the
means by which it integrates, in its own formation, the views of those who are
typically not represented. In this context, unless one has been sleeping through
the past few centuries, one must fairly conclude that among the views that have
not been represented, nor sufficiently capable of giving consent and legitimacy,
are those of women. International law in its historical processes has been a
patriarchal institution. Having said that, the failure of process identified here
does not create a presumption in favor of particular determinations or
conclusions, but such a systematic historical failure does create a particularized
burden-for further integration of the voice of women into the formulation of
international law. I will return to the idea of failure of process and the burdens
of inclusion that such failures generate, but first let's address the other half of
the inquiry regarding the unique and its response to international law.
III. MORAL PARTICULARISM AND ITS RESPONSE TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Should the unique care about what international law has to say? I will rely
on the Islamic context because of my experience, but much of what I will say is
generalizable to other religious traditions, and other morally particular
paradigms. Most fundamentally, the biggest challenge to the idea that the Islamic
ought to care about the international is a rhetorical point, but it is a rhetorical
point with a significant amount of persuasive force. If in Islam, God is sovereign
and God sets the priorities and imperatives that ought to be followed by the
followers of the religion, then in a moral sense what ultimately should matter is
God and God alone, and not what the international community thinks or
demands. International law relies on the consent or will of those governed, but
Islam relies on the will of God, who is the real sovereign and source of
legitimacy. On its face, it is as if the religious answers to a different master, and
thus, could not possibly be reconciled with any claimed universalism that does
not answer to the same source of legitimacy and legality. This is the typical
argument one encounters when one speaks about an Islamic uniqueness, and
whether it should care about what international law mandates. Typically, the
argument is that Muslims-and I believe this can be generalized to other
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religious traditions as well-have a different master, a different source that they
must answer to-a source that is not interested in international legal obligations,
and that is not bound by anything other than itself. Therefore, according to this
view, whether international law says: "give 'x' more rights" or "give 'y' less
rights," ought not to matter to a religious system, or to a system that is not
bound by human will and consent as its source of legitimacy.
Although this argument is popular, it is flawed. There are what might be
described as external and internal objections to this argument-the external
objections have to do with the process of international law, and the internal have
to do with the epistemology and hermeneutic processes of religious
determinations. The religious argument presented above does not adequately
acknowledge the paradigm of consent and legitimacy in international law. Those
who make this argument often assume that international law acts as if it is a god,
legislating ultimate morality without the involvement of various participants,
including the involvement of the religious, unique and particular, into the
process of formulating international law itself. In principle, international law
could incorporate determinations that are based on God's sovereignty or
religious pietistic views concerning what ought to be binding upon all human
beings. Since international law does not need to worry about the doctrine of
separation of church and state, unlike American constitutional law for example,
religious law could be incorporated into international law, as part of what
represents the consent and will of the governed. Conceptually, there is no reason
for religious determinations not to become part of the universals of international
law. If religious perspectives desire to be included in the paradigm of
international law, these perspectives need to be accountable and accessible to the
"other". If a good portion of the world becomes persuaded that a particular
determination ought to become binding on all human beings, the fact that this
determination was derived from a religious tradition is not in itself disqualifying.
There is no reason that the religious should abandon international law, and there
is no reason that international law should become the exclusive realm of the
secular. If the religious is convinced that what it adheres to is good for and
generalizable to humanity, then being involved in the international legal process
means that the religious must find ways of making its assertions about good and
evil or right and wrong accessible and accountable to the "other." By accessible
and accountable, I mean the ability to make the determinations of the religious
coherent and sufficiently convincing, so as to persuade the "other." For
example, the natural law tradition has had a powerful impact upon the field of
human rights, and has contributed to the globalization of the paradigm of
inherent and fundamental human entitlements. Although the natural law
tradition grew out of a Christian religious experience, at the international level, it
was forced to find ways of communicating, persuading, and influencing the
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, theist, and every other convictional system in the
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world.1 There is no doubt that the process of international engagement led to
transformations in the natural law tradition that forced natural law lawyers to
revise many of their constructs and arguments. Whether the revising and
recasting of the natural law tradition was a worthwhile act to the Christian
champions of the doctrine depends on the level of commitment that these
champions might have had. Arguably, for example, it is worthwhile for John
Finnis, who is an influential committed Catholic and natural law jurist, to modify
his arguments for natural law in such a way that his beliefs and convictions
might become more accessible and persuasive to those who do not share his
religious convictions. In this regard, Finnis might be forced to de-emphasize his
references to Catholicism or otherwise downplay the role of his religious
convictions in articulating his natural law theory, but at the same time, he is able
to make his approach more persuasive to Muslims, Jews, or any other non-
Christian group. At the rhetorical level, one might even say that by influencing
the international, the religious is able to expand the realm of God's sovereignty
and will on this earth. The more the world follows what would be consistent
with the demands of the divine, and incorporates these demands into a system
of international obligations, it is difficult to imagine a loss to the idea of divine
sovereignty.
But I think the problem goes deeper than that because from a religious
perspective, this functional approach is not persuasive. As such, the question is:
why should the religious get involved in the process in the first place? Why not
simply abstain from the process, because ultimately, the international process is
irrelevant to the religious frame of reference and structure of authority? To argue
that the unique or religious ought to work through the international paradigm in
order to accomplish incremental achievements is not, by itself, compelling for a
paradigm of uniqueness. We need to look more specifically both at the internal
processes of the unique or religious, and, shifting the gaze, we need to look at
the unique or religious as the potential universal.
IV. THE PARADIGM OF UNIQUENESS AND THE
FAILURE OF PROCESS
Proponents of cultural relativism, and more specifically Islamic
exceptionalism, often ignore the fact that Islam, and most religious traditions,
are the product of cumulative interpretive communities. Importantly, the
On the development of natural rights theory in the West, see Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and
Moral Philosophy: From Grolius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge 1996); Brian Tierney, The Idea
of Natural Rights (Scholars Press 1997). For a useful review of the broad range of theories in the
field, see Carlos Santiago Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights (Clarendon 1993); Tibor R. Machan,
Individuals and Their Rights (Open Court 1989).
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participants in these interpretive communities have not been primarily divine but
human. In other words, we ought not ignore the process that generated
Islamicity in the first place, and the pivotal role of the human agent in the
formulation of Islamic law. To the extent that the religious demands conviction
from its adherents, it necessarily relies on a consensual model for the
establishing of orthodoxy and the creation of dogma. Despite the claims of
divinity, it is important to think about the socio-historical processes that
generated these convictions in the first place. In the case of Islamic law, for
example, there is an authorial enterprise behind many of the determinations that
are treated as orthodox or as the established dogma of the religion. I am not
denying the possible divine origin of many of the legal prescriptions found in
Islam. As a believing Muslim, I developed the conviction that much of what
Islam asserts is the truth is in fact divine. But I also recognize that although
there is a divine core to the religion, much of what defines Islam today is the
product of the cumulative efforts of various interpretive communities that
constitute the collective authorial enterprise behind many of the determinations
associated with the religion. 2 In other words, like international law, the unique or
religious is subject to a sociology of process that reflects the power dynamics
and social biases that prevailed, or continue to prevail, within the interpretive
communities of the religion. As such, the unique or religious is subject to a
failure of process, which in this context means a systematic exclusion of the
voices of particular groups from the authorial enterprise that formed the
determinations of the unique or religious. Importantly, often these failures of
process can be pointed out by outsiders to the tradition-those who are not so
intimately involved in the tradition itself. Such critiques by outsiders, if done in
an arrogant or what might even be called an imperialistic fashion, are most
certainly alienating to the unique or religious. But, in principle, we ought to
recognize that the participation of outsiders in a discourse with the various
traditions of the world offers these traditions an opportunity to notice
entrenched failures of process, and to at least consider whether corrective
measures are warranted. Examples of this are abundant in the international
discourse over the institution of slavery, child labor, trafficking in women, and
women's rights. I am not advocating a one-way moral monologue by a party
claiming to represent the international to the unique or religious. In fact, the
international paradigm is subject to its own failures of process that can benefit
enormously from the critiques of those who have traditionally been excluded or
under-represented. A participatory and cooperative model that recognizes the
right of dissent-not as a right of exception, but as a right of heightened
2 On the authorial enterprises and cumulative interpretive communities in Islamic law, see Khaled
Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Autboty, and Women 96-133 (Oneworld 2001).
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contribution-allows for a strong role to be played by any discourse that
impacts upon the consciences of the international and the unique. In this
paradigm, any good faith discourse that appeals to the consciences of the
interpretive communities that form either the international or the unique is seen
as a moral and ethical good-not as an intrusion or a form of interventionism.
The insularity and exclusiveness of the unique or religious will only help shelter
possible failures of process and will permit whatever hegemonic powers that
might have become established within a particular tradition to go unchallenged.
This is not a minor point because human experience has shown that ethically
troubling practices, such as child marriages, physical abuse of women and
children, female genital mutilation, poor health care, exploitative labor practices,
or homelessness, flourish behind a veil of secrecy, and that often they are
resisted when challenged by outsiders to the culture. Importantly, such practices
are rarely sanctified within a particular culture unless there has been a failure of
process that has contributed to the desensitization of that culture to the social
harm that results from these practices. This is exemplified by the fact that the
failures in process are often identified and analyzed by internal voices to the
culture, and these internal voices are usually the same individuals who have been
the primary victims of this process failure. But if the criticism by outsiders lacks
good faith, or are one-sided monologues, such criticisms will fail to persuade
insiders to the culture, who are ultimately the ones who have to become
convinced that there has been a process failure or that there is a need for reform.
V. THE UNIQUE AS THE UNIVERSAL
The second point to make here relates to the nature of the claim of
uniqueness. I have been referring to the universal and unique as if they are
objective categories, where one represents the mainstream and the other the
exception to the mainstream. But in reality, the claim of universalism can be
made on behalf of an international system or by a particular religion or culture.
For instance, many religious systems do not claim uniqueness as an
individualized exception or particularized prerogative. Rather, such systems
present an often comprehensive view of the moral or just life, and whether such
a view is presented in the form of a demand upon the world or not, it is not
morally or ethically neutral. In other words, often it is not the case that a so-
called unique or religious system is simply demanding that it be allowed an
exception without further normative implications. In claiming dissent from the
larger world context, a system with a comprehensive view of the good and just
life is making a normative argument about the nature and value of human
beings, and the purpose and meaning of life.
In the Islamic context, this may be called the universalistic imperative of
Islam. Islam, like many other religious systems, does not simply claim to regulate
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the life of a small group of individuals living out their own particularities-for
example, Islam does not limit itself to regulating the life of the Arabs of Saudi
Arabia. Instead, Islam is presenting a universal and comprehensive vision of
morality, ethical values, and human worth. Therefore, in the very act of
dissenting from the international paradigm is an offer of an alternative way of
life. If, as in the case of Islam, what we have been, rather inaccurately, calling the
unique is actually universal-in the sense that it is making comprehensive and
transcendent claims about the good life-then every engagement with the world
constitutes an affirmative position. If one universal system claims dissent from
another universal paradigm then, in effect, it is clashing or at least competing
with the alternative. Put differently, when a universal paradigm seeks to dissent,
it cannot simply claim cultural relativism as justification, unless it is willing to
relinquish its claim of universalism. Why is this important? Because when looked
at from this perspective, for instance, in the case of Islam, the very claim of
universality by the Islamic system must come to terms with the fact that the
audience is the world at large. It is notable, for example, that the holy text of the
Qur'an speaks to humanity at large, and not just a specific race or culture. If
Muslims insist on a paradigm of relativism and particularness, and claim Islam as
a specific phenomenon unrelated to the rest of the world, this ultimately
deconstructs and de-legitimates the universalism of Islam. Muslims cannot
ignore the international audience without ultimately deconstructing and
marginalizing Islam as a world religion. But a religion, such as Islam, transcends
not only territorial boundaries, but also many cultural manifestations.
Consequently, Muslims cannot claim that all universalisms are fundamentally
false without making the universalisms of Islam false, as well. If Muslims accept
the possibility of universalism, and also accept that the audience is the world at
large, then even in objecting to an imperative of international law, there is no
peaceful alternative to discourse and the attempt to persuade. But if the
discourse has integrity then it cannot be based on the dismissiveness of claimed
exceptions, or unaccountable entitlements. I will develop this point below.
VI. INTEGRITY OF THE DISCOURSE IN THE PARADIGM OF
UNIQUENESS AND INTERNATIONALISM
Thus far, I have argued that the international and unique cannot ignore
each other without undermining their own legitimacy, and that failures of
process, experienced in each of the paradigms, can be detected and corrected
only through a cooperative and participatory paradigm of serious discourse. But
there are difficult practical problems that confront us on this point because the
discourse, when it exists, is marred with defects and failures. Nevertheless, if I
am correct that the international cannot ignore the unique, and the unique
cannot ignore the international, failures in the discourse should not determine
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whether there ought to be a discourse in the first place. If we recognize the
importance of the engagement between the international and unique, discourse
failures are only augmented if either the international or unique submit to the
unhelpful logic of privileged exceptions or unaccountable entitlements. To be
more concrete, entering reservations to human rights treaties where, in effect, a
country accedes to the obligations set by the treaty but only to the extent that
such obligations conform, for instance, to Islamic law or American law would be
an example of the logic of exceptionalism, which undermines the integrity of the
discourse. It would be of far greater integrity to refuse to sign the treaty, and
justify such a position to the world community, and if the position is not
justifiable, to bear the consequences of such an abstention. Similarly, the
unaccountable privilege of veto power that some nations enjoy in the Security
Council is another example of a practice that is irreconcilable with the integrity
of discourse.
The engagement between the unique and international is premised on the
assumption that the discourse between the two must be open, accessible, and
responsive. In fact, it must meet what I will refer to as the conditions of integrity
in discourse, namely: diligence, honesty, self-restraint, reasonableness, and
comprehensiveness. I would argue that each of these conditions is necessary for
both the integrity of the discourse within the unique, and also between the
unique and international. The conditions of integrity in discourse aim to limit the
possibilities for abuse and despotism that often result from the failures of
process experienced within the unique or the international. I have argued
elsewhere that the violation of the conditions of integrity strongly contributes to
the legitimating or construction of authoritarian dynamics that undermine and
paralyze the process of discourse. 3 The lack of integrity in discourse strongly
contributes to de-legitimizing and the breaking down of the authoritativeness of
the participants, and ultimately, ending the vitality of the discourse.
In practice, there are many problems that affect the integrity of the
discourse within the unique and also between the unique and international. For
example, one serious problem that many commentators have already addressed
is the problem of hypocrisy in the assertion of international human rights. For
example, few are interested in the plight of Palestinian women, in terms of
health care and education, under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza,
while a far greater number of people were interested in the plight of women
under the Taliban. One can provide endless examples of hypocrisy and very
selective levels of sensitivity in the discourses between the unique and
international, and in fact, I think that if one had to identify the most difficult
3 For a justification of these conditions of integrity, see Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God's Name at 53-
58 (cited in note 2).
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challenge to the necessary integrity in discourse, it would be both the actual and
perceived hypocrisy and double standards that plague this field. However, it is
important to note that the same type of hypocrisy and selective sensitivity exist
in the inner dynamics of the unique as well. For instance, the suffering of
women or insular minorities within specific paradigms of the unique does not
receive the same level of sensitivity or attention as other more politically
empowered groups.
This leads us to another one of the recurrent problems plaguing the
integrity of discourse. Many claims of uniqueness are made simply as a point of
political empowerment, and not as a point of moral empowerment. The unique
itself is frequently hindered by the rampant use of apologetics, primarily as a
defensive response to the international. For example, in the Islamic context,
claims made within the unique and to the international are often made not to
explore or explain Islam, but as a defensive response towards the other. Many
claims made within the Islamic context are motivated by the sole desire to prove
Islam's ability to compete morally with every other paradigm. So when some, for
instance, say that Islam liberated women, they do not say it as an assertion to be
analyzed, disputed, and proven, but simply as a point of cheerleading for the
tradition in order to score a point against the other-typically, the West. But the
rampant use of apologetics by the unique, or Islamists, does not only lead to the
failure of discourses within Islam, but also to the failure of the international to
take the claims of the unique seriously. The use of apologetics, and the reaction
to such apologetics, leads to a situation where statements made about what
Islam is or is not-whether such statements are made by the participants
internal to the unique or by the international in response to the unique-are
often based on the most impressionistic and politicized pieces of evidence that
in fact have nearly nothing to do with the mechanics and realities of the Islamic
tradition. Put simply, the use of apologetics and defensive discourses within the
unique lead to a denigration of the quality of discourse either within the unique,
or between the unique and the international.
On the same theme of exploiting the unique and international to seek
political empowerment, one finds the unique is frequently constructed primarily
as a means of asserting a separate identity of the other. Importantly, just as
frequently the outsiders dealing with a tradition are eager to accept the claim of
uniqueness, but primarily as a means of distinguishing and denigrating the other.
While we find that some claim an exaggerated sense of uniqueness in search of a
separate identity, we also find that the acceptance of these claims is sometimes
motivated by the same desire for distinction and autonomous identity. Examples
of this process are easily found, for instance, in the assertions of Muslim
fundamentalists about Islam's attitude towards women, and the eager willingness
of Western fundamentalists to accept these assertions as true. In this context,
Muslims who attempt to find grounds of commonality between Islam and the
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West finds themselves accused by both sides-the Islamist and the Western-of
lacking legitimacy or genuineness. 4 So, for example, as an Islamic scholar, I can
look into biographical dictionaries that were written 600 or even 1,000 years ago,
and find that these biographical dictionaries list hundreds of Muslim women
jurists. On one occasion, I found a reference about a woman jurist who used to
pray in the midst of men-right there in the same line as men prayed. A jurist,
named Abu Layla, asked her to move from the men's prayer rows, and join the
women. She said: "They are not more knowledgeable than me, so why should
I?" In the midst of rampant apologetics, and in the midst of highly politicized
assertions of Islamic authenticity, which are not necessarily vouched for by the
actual historical record, it becomes exceedingly difficult to speak about the
possibilities that contextual examples, such as this, may offer for curing failures
of process within Islam, and finding commonalities with other human beings.
My point is that the historical record offers possibilities that could enrich the
internal and external discourses, but that such possibilities are inadequately
exploited because of the lack of integrity that often plagues such discourses. In
the case of Islam, the historical record is often not consistent with the typical
assumptions that either insiders or outsiders hold about what Islam is or is not.
But engaging the historical record critically, honestly, and rigorously is often
hampered by the primacy of political considerations that the derail serious
investigations of the tradition. Importantly, the failure of international law
practitioners to take the processes of international law seriously, and the use of
these processes as a stick to smack people on the head, instead of engaging
them, leads to the corruption of the discourse with the unique. Put differently,
too many practitioners of international law seek to find a uniqueness or
difference when such differences are in fact not compelling, or at least, not
inevitable. Similarly, the apologetic and defensive practitioners of the Islamic
tradition do not take the Islamic tradition very seriously, but often claim it as a
way of affirming a distinctive identity-affirming a perceived uniqueness that
does not necessarily exist.
VII. SKEPTICISM AND SEEKING THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME
In studying the arguments of those who have argued that uniqueness is
dispositive, and that most universals are false, one is struck by the fact that,
especially in the Islamic context, nearly every claim of relativism-and nearly
every claim of uniqueness-is expressed on a foundation of cultural arrogance.
For example, I recently wrote a review of a book that argues that Muslims have
4 For an example of this see my essay on tolerance in Islam and the responses to my essay,




Chicago Journal of International Law
their own sense of reality; they do not really have a Western sense of time, and
really do not have the same sense of reality that Westerners do. According to
this book, Muslims must be accommodated in their own way because they have
a very different way of seeing and understanding life. 5 The most striking thing
about this book is the extent to which its ostensible accommodationist approach
to Islam masks an undeniably condescending attitude towards Muslims. For
accommodationists, such as the book's author, the claim of deference to
uniqueness amounts to nothing more than saying Muslims have a right to be
uniquely ugly, uniquely stupid, or uniquely despotic! This surreptitious
concession to the integrity and autonomy of the other is actually nothing more
than another manifestation of the lack of integrity in discourse. The point is not
that every claim of uniqueness must be treated as inherently suspect, but that a
healthy dose of skepticism would be advisable when dealing with a claimed
uniqueness either by insiders or outsiders to a tradition. Moreover, those who
claim established universals ought to be vigorously questioned about the failures
in their own processes and the integrity of their own discourses.
I will close with a note about a possible universal that might help establish
common grounds for a cooperative and participatory collaborative venture for
the international and the unique. When one looks at the tradition of discourse in
the international context, and when one looks at the tradition of discourse in
many of the unique contexts, particularly those that are religious, one will find
that what unifies them is a preoccupation with discovering the aesthetic of the
sublime-with discovering beauty in the human condition. I have not yet found
in the Islamic context-nor in my readings in Judaism or Christianity-a single
authority who says: "we particularly cherish the ugly." And I have not found
ugliness cherished by anyone writing on behalf of the international or unique. I
would suggest the aesthetic of the sublime-the idea of beauty and the
conditions that promote what is beautiful-as a unifying goal of humanity. The
sublime is a state of human goodness in which people feel safe, healthy, fulfilled,
dignified, and free from suffering. I think that intuitively we sense that suffering,
including suffering because of a patriarchal context, is never a beautiful thing.
And from the perspective of the Islamic, it would be truly difficult to argue that
God finds beauty in the suffering of a human being. Furthermore, I would argue
that in direct proportion to the spread of suffering is the regression of the
sublime and beautiful in human life. The greater the amount of social and
economic hardship and misery, the lesser the ability of human beings to reach
for the aesthetic or the sublime, including the ability to overcome the physical
See Khaled Abou El Fad], Islamic Law and Ambivalent Scholarship, 100 Mich L Rev 1421 (2002),
(reviewing Lawrence Rosen, The Justice of Islam: Camparalive Perpedives on Islamic Law and Society
(Oxford 2000)).
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limitations of life and to reach for the transcendent. If a human being does not
feel a sense of significance in life, dignity, and safety, the conditions for the
creation of beauty, including the transcendent is seriously compromised. I would
argue that belief in religion, the generation of folklore, art, thought, fidelity, and
love are parts of the aesthetic of the sublime, but that such metaphysical
accomplishments without the fulfillment of physical needs, such as safety and
health, are very difficult. I think that if we get beyond the failures of process, and
the lack of integrity in discourse, we are forced to confront the humanness of
human beings, with all their physical, metaphysical, and transcendent aspirations.
Whatever quashes the human being and forces him or her to live in a state of
mere subsistence, without the ability to think, learn, dream, and hope cannot be
considered beautiful. According to this paradigm, it is reasonable to assert that
whatever increases the suffering of human beings, and robs them of their
physical well-being and transcendental abilities should be subject to heightened
levels of scrutiny, and an added burden of explanation and justification. If there
is evidence that the members of a society are denied the ability to engage in the
aesthetic of the sublime, whoever claims that such a condition is justified, either
under the paradigm of internationalism or uniqueness, must be subjected to
closer scrutiny, and should shoulder a heavier burden of justification. The
aesthetic of the sublime, I think, that might be a good starting point for a
discoursive process that can be integrative, legitimate, and ultimately end up in
an institution that is collaborative, and that is truly human, with all the sublime
qualities that are inherent in the word human.
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